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Personal freedoms in Zimbabwe have disintegrated overthe past few years as President Robert Mugabe has com-promised the civil and political rights of citizens to
maintain his grip on power. In the face of mounting oppo-
sition to his rule, Mugabe has severely restricted the rights of
journalists to express themselves freely, the rights of opposi-
tion political parties to hold rallies and meetings, and the
rights of citizens to assemble freely. These rights are protected
under the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as well as international
covenants to which Zimbabwe is a party. These restrictions
have been codified in two news laws—the Access to Infor-
mation and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002 and the
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002. Both laws were
instituted prior to a contentious presidential race in March
2002 and have allowed Mugabe to solidify his hold on power
by subrogating any opposition while claiming to uphold the
rule of law. This effort, which assured him an electoral victory
despite failing to meet international election standards, will
have far-reaching consequences on the rights of Zimbab-
weans to assemble, speak, and conduct a free press for years
to come. In addition, Zimbabwe’s problems come at a time
when the rest of the continent is moving toward democracy
and transparency. The failures of Zimbabwe will reflect poorly
upon pan-African efforts to achieve these goals.
Background
President Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe since it gained inde-
pendence in 1980. After maneuvering to head the largest
army that fought against white minority rule, he came to power
espousing reconciliation with the white population that had pre-
viously ruled Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was formerly known.
Mugabe initially attempted to establish a de jure one-party state
with his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) as the sole legal political party. He did not
succeed, however, and created a de facto one-party state instead. 
During the formative stages of Mugabe’s rule, the admin-
istration did not tolerate dissent. In the early 1980s Mugabe
sent the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe
National Army to the Matabeleland region of the country,
where it killed 20,000 people. Matabeleland, a base for many
critics of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, was home of the Ndebele peo-
ple who were united behind Joshua Nkomo and his Zim-
babwe African People’s Union party (ZAPU), which opposed
Mugabe’s centralization of power. Nkomo eventually agreed
to a power-sharing agreement in which he would serve as
vice president as long as he merged his party with ZANU-PF,
thus eliminating the only major opposition party. This mas-
sacre, known in Zimbabwe as the Gukuruhundi, or “the rains
that cleanse,” set the tone for Mugabe’s response to future
attempts at political opposition. 
From the late 1980s until the late 1990s, small political par-
ties emerged, such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM),
to contest an occasional parliamentary seat or run a symbolic
presidential candidate who had no real chance of unseating
Mugabe. Even though these parties posed no practical risk to
Mugabe due to limited exposure and support, he did not hes-
itate to resort to violence and intimidation to ensure that no
opposition party gained a foothold in Zimbabwean politics.
For example, a ZANU-PF television ad broadcast during the
1990 presidential race threatened constituents who did not
wish to support ZANU-PF. The announcer of the ad, which
featured a car crash, stated: “This is one way to die. Another
way is to vote for ZUM. Don’t commit suicide. Vote ZANU-
PF and live.”
Mugabe’s hold on power began to crumble in September
1999, when the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) was born out of the labor movement. The MDC
demonstrated its strength in February 2000 when it mobilized
an effective campaign to defeat a referendum on a draft
constitution written by ZANU-PF that would greatly expand
the powers of the president. This was the first defeat ZANU-
PF ever suffered at the polls. Four months later, the MDC
emerged from a bloody parliamentary election campaign to
win almost 50 percent of the elected seats. In the process,
ZANU-PF members killed hundreds of people and tortured
thousands, the vast majority of them MDC members. 
The presidential election was due to be held in less than two
years. ZANU-PF’s efforts to use violence and intimidation failed
to defeat the MDC. In subsequent court challenges, the MDC
nullified the elections of several ZANU-PF members of Parlia-
ment after the Zimbabwe High Court ruled that ZANU-PF’s
heavy-handed campaign tactics created an illegal advantage
for the ruling party. Although many judges who ruled against
ZANU-PF were forced to resign, opposition support continued
to grow. It was clear that the traditional tactic of violent sup-
pression of opposition would not be enough to ensure Mugabe’s
re-election. To enhance its candidate’s chances of winning the
presidency, ZANU-PF resorted to instituting new laws in order
to limit dissent, free expression, and free assembly.
The Public Order and Security Act of 2002 
POSA, which was passed in January 2002, replaced the Law
and Order Maintenance Act of 1960 (LOMA), one of the few
pieces of legislation retained from the Rhodesian era. LOMA
generally outlined police powers, state security measures,
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and the limits of personal freedom as they related to state secu-
rity. LOMA was considered to be a draconian piece of legis-
lation that served the interests of the white minority. Ironi-
cally, the Rhodesian regime often invoked this statute to
inhibit the revolutionary forces and their supporters who
now rule Zimbabwe. Mugabe kept LOMA in place after inde-
pendence mainly due to its effectiveness in suppressing dis-
sent against the government. The decision to replace LOMA
came after years of public criticism over its colonial roots and
the Mugabe regime’s desire to restrict opposition to the gov-
ernment beyond the boundaries of LOMA.
Effects of the Public Order and Security Act on 
Freedom of Expression 
Although LOMA was generally considered restrictive,
POSA has maintained, and in some instances expanded, lim-
itations on personal freedom, including freedom of expres-
sion. POSA retains the provision of LOMA that criminalized
insulting the president, although the passage of POSA reduced
the penalty from five years of imprisonment to one. Section
16 of POSA criminalizes the making of virtually any negative
comment about the president in his professional or personal
capacity. This section also crimi-
nalizes any printed or broadcast
“abusive, indecent, obscene or false
statement” directed toward the pres-
ident. Although there is no inde-
pendent electronic media within
Zimbabwe, virtually any writer at
an independent newspaper could
be arrested for criticizing the pres-
ident. In practice, however, the gov-
ernment has chosen to prosecute
journalists under AIPPA rather than rely on this provision. 
An additional provision of POSA that inhibits the right of
free expression is section 15, which prohibits making any false
statements prejudicial to the government, or any oral or
written false statements that may, inter alia, adversely affect
Zimbabwean defense or economic interests, or undermine
public confidence in defense and law enforcement agen-
cies. The determination of what constitutes a “false state-
ment” is left up to the executive. This provision not only
affects any local or foreign journalist writing about Zim-
babwe, but also severely hinders human rights groups and
other advocacy organizations that serve as a check on the gov-
ernment. If the press and non-governmental organizations are
stripped of their power to criticize the state, critical debate
in Zimbabwe will come to a virtual halt. 
Another new clause incorporated into POSA is section 12,
which addresses causing disaffection among the police forces.
Under this clause, any person who commits an act that may
be construed as attempting to cause the police or defense
forces to withhold their loyalty, services, or allegiance, or to
commit a breach of discipline, may be fined 20,000 Zim-
babwe dollars (U.S.$357) and imprisoned for up to two years.
Because most police stations have close ties to government-
sponsored militias and often apply the law selectively, many
opposition supporters who report acts of political violence to
the police are told that the police cannot help MDC members. 
According to section 12, any person who makes public state-
ments condemning the actions of the police or suggesting that
they should uphold the rule of law may be a target for pros-
ecution. For example, MDC official Kenneth Mathe was
arrested and brought before a magistrate in the resort town
of Victoria Falls on January 24, 2003 for violating section
12(a) of POSA. In an interview with the opposition newspa-
per Daily News, Mr. Mathe commented on reports that police
and members of the armed forces were beating civilians in the
area after the murder of an Australian tourist. He likened the
events to the Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s. The
police interpreted his statement as “causing disaffection
amongst members of the Police Force or Defense Forces,”
arrested him, and released him on bail pending trial. 
Effects of the Public Order and Security Act on 
Freedom of Assembly 
Section 5 of POSA addresses acts of subversion. The lan-
guage of section 5 is so broad, however, that even peaceful
protests may be subject to prosecution. Specifically, subsection
2(iii) of this act makes “coercing or attempting to coerce the
Government” a crime punishable by up to 20 years of impris-
onment. “Coercing” is defined as “constraining, compelling
or restraining” through “boycott, civil disobedience or resis-
tance to any law, whether such resistance is active or passive
. . . if accompanied by physical force or violence or threat of
physical force or violence.” Thus, any participant in a rally or
a mass stayaway may be subject to prosecution under this
clause. This would include any participant in a rally that is later
attacked by a government-sponsored militia, which occurs
with some regularity. 
Section 17 of POSA, which addresses public violence, has
been expanded to apply to anyone
who “forcibly disturbs the peace,
security or order of the public . . .
or invades the rights of other peo-
ple.” On the surface, the objective
of this provision seems to preserve
the peace by punishing rioters. A
closer examination reveals that it
can be applied to anyone who
objects to the operations of the
state. For example, Raymond
Majongwe, secretary-general of the Progressive Teacher’s
Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), was twice arrested under sec-
tion 17 while leading a nonviolent national teacher’s strike
in October 2002. Each time, he was arrested for approaching
teachers at schools and encouraging them to join the strike.
During the first arrest he was badly beaten in police custody
and prevented from seeking medical attention for days. Dur-
ing the second arrest he was tortured by having electrodes
applied to his genitals and his mouth. The police told him to
call off the strike and not to talk to the press. 
In general, POSA strengthens the police force and equips
it with broader powers to inhibit demonstrations. Section 25,
which regulates public gatherings, has enabled police to
approve, disapprove, or shut down virtually any public gath-
ering at will. Any person who wishes to hold a public gather-
ing must provide advance notice to the authorities, who then
have the power to determine the duration, location, and
route of the gathering. The authorities may deny any request
for a public gathering if they claim it will cause public disor-
der, a breach of the peace, or an obstruction to any thor-
oughfare. Any organizer of a public gathering who fails to seek
approval from the state may be fined up to $10,000 Zim-
babwe dollars (U.S.$179) and imprisoned for up to six months
according to section 24(6). In addition, section 27 gives the
police the power to prohibit any gathering within a specific
police district for up to three months. Section 28 provides that
the organizer of any public gathering who has breached any
aspect of POSA relating to such gatherings may be held civilly
liable for damage that results from the gathering. Further, sec-
tion 31 states that any person at a public gathering who
“engages in disorderly or riotous conduct; or uses threaten-
continued on next page
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ing, abusive or insulting words; or behaves in a threatening,
abusive or insulting manner” may be liable for a fine up to
$50,000 Zimbabwe dollars (U.S.$893) and may be impris-
oned for up to two years. Police have even required advance
notice of political discussions taking place at public places in
the capital city of Harare.
Officials have relied on POSA when arresting elected
MDC officials. On January 11, 2003, Harare Mayor Elias
Mudzuri, his deputy mayor, and several members of the city
council were arrested and charged with addressing an illegal
gathering under section 25(1) of POSA, which regulates
public gatherings that may cause “public disorder; or a breach
of the peace; or an obstruction of any thoroughfare.” Accord-
ing to the British Broadcasting Corporation, at the time of
their arrest, the officials were holding a meeting with residents
at the city council building and were discussing municipal
issues such as water, sewage, and roads. 
Because POSA was passed two months before the presi-
dential election, the restrictions on public gatherings had a
serious effect on the campaign for the presidency. President
Mugabe addressed roughly 50 rallies during that period and
all ZANU-PF rallies were allowed to proceed unhindered. In
contrast, Morgan Tsvangirai, the head of the MDC and its can-
didate for president, managed to hold only eight rallies. The
MDC secured a court order to prevent the police from inter-
fering in a rally in February 2002, but cancelled the rally
after police refused to provide security in the face of mount-
ing threats. In all, the police used POSA to disrupt or prevent
83 MDC rallies between January and March 2002. They often
prevented MDC meetings in private homes as well, and dis-
rupted a meeting between Mr. Tsvangirai and diplomats
held at a hotel. The police disrupted several gatherings of the
Zimbabwe Election Support Network, an organization devoted
to voter education and free and fair elections, after classify-
ing the gathering as political and therefore subject to the pro-
visions of POSA. 
The Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act of 2002 
The Zimbabwean Constitution has never explicitly guar-
anteed freedom of the press, although it does guarantee free
expression to all citizens in section 20, which has been inter-
preted to include journalists. Before AIPPA was passed in
March 2002, journalists were prevented from publishing infor-
mation that contained state secrets or could be proven to be
defamatory. There was no law hindering the ability of journalists
to operate, except for a statute regulating electronic media. 
Accreditation of Journalists and Mass Media Outlets 
AIPPA has drastically changed the work of journalists in
Zimbabwe. Among other measures, it has created a Media and
Information Commission (Commission) to oversee the press,
has imposed a strict registration policy on journalists, and has
introduced severe penalties for publishing false informa-
tion. Three members of the Commission are chosen by offi-
cials from journalist organizations and three by associations
of media owners, while the remaining members are chosen
by the minister of information under orders from the presi-
dent. The minister has the power to accept or reject any
members nominated by journalists and media owners and
holds the final decision, along with the president, as to who
sits on the Commission. 
The Commission has the power to register any individual
journalists and all mass media outlets, including newspa-
pers, magazines, news services, and any organization that
derives revenue from news collection and dissemination.
Sections 65 through 77 of AIPPA specify who may be a mass
media owner, the manner in which he or she must apply for
registration, and the manner in which he or she must oper-
ate in order to retain registration with the Commission. Sec-
tion 65 provides that all mass media owners must at least be
citizens of Zimbabwe. In addition, all partial owners must be
permanent residents of Zimbabwe. Under section 69, the
Commission may refuse to register any organization that vio-
lates the Act and may suspend or nullify registration due to
bankruptcy of any owner or membership in a banned orga-
nization pursuant to section 71. 
In a country where there is little internal capital investment,
section 71 severely hampers the ability of news organizations
to raise money. In addition, the mandatory registration of jour-
nalists amounts to the requirement of approval from the
government to practice as a journalist. In practice, local jour-
nalists are initially granted registration, but renewal by the
Commission is delayed or halted for those who have been par-
ticularly critical of the government. A journalist cannot report
freely on government activities if he or she is worried about
the nullification of his or her registration. 
Journalists are subject to individual registration according
to sections 78 through 90 of AIPPA. Under section 79, all jour-
nalists must apply to the Commission for registration that must
be renewed annually. Only Zimbabwean citizens and per-
manent residents are eligible to receive this type of accredi-
tation. Section 79(4) stipulates that any foreign reporter may
be accredited for a maximum of 30 days. Therefore, all
reporters from outside the country must get prior approval
from the government and inform it of the subject of their
work. A foreign media outlet may set up a permanent office
in Zimbabwe, but only with prior approval from the Com-
mission according to section 90. 
As a result of the passage of section 79, numerous foreign
journalists have been denied entry into Zimbabwe after their
requests for temporary accreditation were denied. Among
those denied visas were Sally Sara of the Australian Broad-
continued on next page
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casting Corporation and David Blair of the British Daily Tele-
graph who was immediately deported upon arrival. Further,
the government alleges that it accredited 580 journalists
before the March 2002 presidential election, but a private
media watchdog group, the Media Institute of Southern
Africa, suggests that number is closer to 72. 
Local reporters have been most affected by the registration
policy. For example, Fanuel Jongwe, a senior reporter for the
Daily News, was arrested on January 27, 2003 in the town of
Zvishavane along with five foreigners and charged under
section 79 of AIPPA, which prohibits practicing journalism
without a license from the Commission. The five foreigners,
reported to be members of the World Lutheran Foundation
(WLF), were charged under sec-
tion 72, which prohibits running a
media outlet without authorization.
Jongwe stated that he had been
invited to cover the WLF’s activi-
ties as a development organization
in the area. The group was later
released after police confiscated a
laptop, notebooks, cameras, and lit-
erature. 
Effects of the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act on
Freedom of Expression 
Possibly more troubling to journalists than the accredita-
tion issue are the new restrictions on freedom of expression
imposed by AIPPA. Section 64, entitled “Abuse of Freedom of
Expression,” criminalizes usage of mass media outlets to com-
mit a criminal offense or publish a false record. Anyone who
violates this section may be fined up to $100,000 Zimbabwe
dollars (U.S.$1786) and may be sentenced to up to two years
in jail. While many countries hold journalists civilly liable for
defamation, criminal liability serves to stifle the free expres-
sion of information due to the threat of imprisonment. 
Individual journalists are also criminally liable from pub-
lishing false information under section 80, which provides
penalties if a journalist “falsifies or fabricates information, pub-
lishes falsehoods . . . or contravenes any of the provisions” of
AIPPA. The definition of a falsehood is left up to the Com-
mission and the minister of information. The penalties for vio-
lating this section are up to a $100,000 Zimbabwe dollars
(U.S.$1786) fine and up to two years in jail. 
These sections of AIPPA have been used repeatedly to
detain journalists who publish stories that criticize the gov-
ernment. In April 2002, Geoff Nyarota, the editor-in-chief of
the Daily News, was arrested under section 80 after publish-
ing a story accusing the Registrar General of Elections of
releasing contradictory information to different media out-
lets concerning the results of the presidential election. In his
subsequent legal challenge, Nyarota was remanded to prison
until early 2003 while the government considers whether
section 80 of the AIPPA violates section 20 of the Constitu-
tion, which guarantees freedom of expression. In total, at least
16 journalists were arrested and charged under section 80
from the time of the presidential election until early July 2002. 
Zimbabwe’s Responsibilities under the Zimbabwean
Constitution and International Law
AIPPA’s Compliance with the Constitution and 
International Law 
AIPPA has sparked fierce constitutional debate within
Zimbabwe. Section 20 of the Constitution maintains that
every citizen has the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart ideas and information without interference, and
freedom from interference with his correspondence.” There
are exceptions to this right. In Section 20(2)(a), exceptions
are made in the interest of “defence, public safety, public
order, the economic interests of the State, public morality or
public health.” AIPPA goes one step further, however, and
restricts freedom of expression on the basis of accuracy of
information as perceived by the state. This is clearly a limi-
tation the Constitution did not intend, and is currently being
debated by the courts. 
In addition, the provisions of AIPPA outlined above vio-
late Zimbabwe’s obligations under international law. Article
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Zimbabwe is a state party, guarantees
freedom of expression, including
“freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.” The
only restrictions that may be
imposed are those that are pro-
vided for by law and aim to protect
the rights or reputations of oth-
ers, national security, public order,
public health, or morals. Any
restriction must be justified as
“necessary” for achieving one of these purposes. General
Comment 10, which elaborates on the implementation of Arti-
cle 19, is clear that a state party may impose restrictions on
the right to freedom of expression only if such restrictions do
not jeopardize the right itself.
AIPPA’s requirement that journalists provide accurate
information is in violation of Zimbabwe’s international oblig-
ations. Although most international bodies recognize some
restrictions on press freedom to protect national security, AIP-
PA’s prohibition against publishing false information regard-
less of content surpasses acceptable international norms. By
making journalists criminally liable for their reports, AIPPA
has trampled on internationally recognized components of
a free press by imposing illegitimate restrictions on journal-
ists’ right to freedom of expression. Further, the restrictions
on the press not only inhibit journalists’ right to impart
information, but they also jeopardize the public’s right to
receive information. Unless AIPPA is amended, a truly free
word may never again be published in Zimbabwe, in turn sti-
fling public debate among Zimbabweans.
Zimbabwe also has obligations as a state party to the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR).
Article 9 states that “every individual shall have the right to
receive information,” and “every person shall have the right
to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.”
AIPPA certainly violates this provision by withholding regis-
tration from some independent journalists and prosecuting
others for publishing allegedly false information. Imposing
such limitations violates the Constitution, making its legal
application dubious. In addition, AIPPA contradicts the spirit
of Article 9 of the ACHPR. 
AIPPA also contradicts nearly every provision of the Wind-
hoek Declaration (Declaration) (1991) governing freedom
of the press in Africa. Zimbabwe signed this document, which
was drafted during the General Conference of United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1989 and
later passed by the UN General Assembly. The Declaration
establishes that a free press is essential to a functioning
democracy and every effort should be taken to remove gov-
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ernment restrictions on the press, establish constitutional
guarantees of press freedom, and protect journalists from-
prohibitions on their freedom of expression. Specifically, the
Declaration states that “African States should be encouraged
to provide constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press . . . .” Additionally, the Declaration asserts that “African
Governments that have jailed journalists for their profes-
sional activities should free them immediately.” 
These documents represent the will of Africa and the will
of the world in allowing free speech. By preventing free
access to information through the restrictions in AIPPA,
Zimbabwe is turning its back on regional and international
standards to which it previously agreed to adhere. Through-
out its current crisis, Zimbabwe has repeatedly said that
African problems demand African solutions, but this argument
holds little weight considering the disrespect Mugabe has
shown to standards of free speech outlined by the ACHPR. 
POSA’s Compliance with the Constitution and 
International Law 
Zimbabwe has contravened sections of its own Constitution
and provisions of international law by passing and imple-
menting POSA. Section 21 of the Constitution guarantees the
right to assembly and does not provide for the sweeping
authority POSA gives to officers of the state to restrict such
gatherings. Further, Section 20 provides for freedom of
expression and makes exceptions only for the protection of
national security, defamation, and other circumstances relat-
ing to the general public welfare. POSA’s restrictions on
freedom of assembly, including breaking up private meetings
and outlawing all public assembly in certain areas for up to
three months certainly contradict the Constitution, even if
state security is considered. The assembly itself should always
be guaranteed even if the content of the discussions at cer-
tain gatherings may be regulated, in extreme circumstances,
in the interests of security. 
POSA also contradicts many provisions of the ICCPR. Arti-
cle 21 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly and only
provides for exceptions for situations “necessary in a democ-
ratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Pre-
venting peaceful demonstrations as stipulated under POSA can-
not be considered necessary in a democratic society. These
internationally recognized provisions, if implemented, would
allow Zimbabweans of all political persuasions to assemble
peacefully. As POSA is written, this is not possible. 
Article 11 of the ACHPR states that every individual shall
have the right of free assembly provided he abides by the law.
As provisions of POSA itself may be unconstitutional, certain
provisions may violate Article 11 regarding to peaceful assem-
bly. These provisions represent the will of Africa to protect
peaceful assembly. POSA’s restrictions on assembly and crit-
icism of the president contradict the will of Zimbabwe’s
neighbors and the previous will of Zimbabwe itself. 
Conclusion
POSA and AIPPA represent an assault on the freedoms of
the Zimbabwean people guaranteed to them under the
ICCPR, the ACHPR, and their own Constitution. A careful
examination of both acts reveals that they were designed in
part to aid the government during the presidential election
and were used afterward to silence opposition voices and
journalists in the independent media. Unchallenged, they cre-
ate a virtual police state in which the government can deny
any public assembly (even gatherings in private homes),
prosecute any person for a perceived threat or insult to the
government, prevent journalists from expressing themselves,
and prosecute journalists who disseminate information con-
trary to the official version of events. While sections of these
acts are being challenged in court, they represent a trend by
Mugabe and the government of Zimbabwe to put self-preser-
vation before the rights of the people. 
These pieces of legislation are symptomatic of the larger
problem of Mugabe’s autocracy and disregard for the needs
of the Zimbabwean people. At age 79 and a hardened veteran
of many physical and political battles, it is unlikely that he will
have a change of heart and loosen his grip on basic freedoms.
As internal dissent is suppressed, the key to the reinstatement
of these rights lies within the international community, start-
ing with Zimbabwe’s neighbors. As Zimbabwe dwindles deeper
in its political and economic problems it relies more on
international organizations such as the Commonwealth, an
organization composed mainly of Britain and its former
colonies, and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). To date, SADC has offered mild criticism, and the
Commonwealth renewed its suspension of Zimbabwe for a sec-
ond year due to gross neglect of human rights. Despite
mounting criticism, African powers such as South Africa and
Nigeria have shielded Zimbabwe from further action by the
Commonwealth while SADC has taken little significant action.
South African President Thabo Mbeki recently suffered a
setback to his “quiet diplomacy” efforts with the Mugabe
regime. Days after using POSA to arrest MDC Vice Presi-
dent Gibson Sibanda for his involvement in leading success-
ful mass stayaways protesting the government, Minister of Jus-
tice Patrick Chinamasa announced that neither POSA nor
AIPPA would be amended in any way because the government
is “under siege” from the MDC. The government had con-
sidered the idea of amending POSA and AIPPA as a way of
easing sanctions and gaining favor among international bod-
ies, but eventually abandoned this plan.
The test of Africa’s future begins with Zimbabwe. If the
ideals of the African Charter are going to be realized, ushering
in an era of democracy and peaceful transfer of power
through free and fair elections, Zimbabwe must be used as
a model. African leaders must join the international call for
“smart” sanctions targeted at Zimbabwe’s leadership, not its
suffering population. The Commonwealth and SADC should
strip Zimbabwe of any power within their organizations until
a legitimate election has been held. Most importantly, all
nations should condemn the restriction of basic rights and
the establishment of an autocracy where a democracy once
existed. If all nations, especially African nations, condemn
Mugabe’s tactics, he might be convinced to leave office and
hand over power to a more moderate government. Only
then can Zimbabweans hope to enjoy the rights guaranteed
to them by their Constitution and the laws of humanity. 
*Jamal Jafari is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief. 
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